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Cognex Legacy In-Sight Cameras: Lifecycle and Security

In-Sight Explorer Vulnerability: The 2025 CISA Advisory Explained

The In-Sight Explorer vulnerability advisory ICSA-25-261-06: affected cameras, the nine flaws by class, no patch, and what to do on a plant network.

Vladimir Romanov


The In-Sight Explorer vulnerability advisory, ICSA-25-261-06, is the one a plant with older Cognex cameras should read first. Released by CISA on 18 September 2025, it lists nine vulnerabilities across the older In-Sight camera firmware and the In-Sight Explorer software, and it names no patch. This page explains what is affected, what the flaws allow, and what to do on a plant network. It belongs to the Lifecycle and Security page in the Cognex technology cluster.

What is affected

CISA’s advisory is titled “Cognex In-Sight Explorer and In-Sight Camera Firmware”. It lists these affected products, as CISA states them:

ProductVersions CISA lists
In-Sight 2000 seriesAll versions 5.x through 6.5.1
In-Sight 7000 seriesAll versions 5.x through 6.5.1
In-Sight 8000 seriesAll versions 5.x through 6.5.1
In-Sight 9000 seriesAll versions 5.x through 6.5.1
In-Sight ExplorerAll versions 5.x through 6.5.1

CISA gives the overall severity as CVSS v4 8.6 and the sector as critical manufacturing, deployed worldwide. The In-Sight 2800, 3800 and 8900 are not in the advisory. The advisory credits Diego Giubertoni of Nozomi Networks with the report.

Check your own installed versions. The advisory covers everything from 5.x up to and including 6.5.1, which is the last Explorer release we found (October 2024). There is no later version to move to within the older line.

The nine vulnerabilities, by class

We group them by what they mean for a plant rather than by number. We do not repeat the CVE identifiers here; they are on the CISA page.

ClassWhat CISA describesPlant meaning
Credentials in the clearCredentials exposed during a firmware upgrade, and user credentials sent unencrypted on proprietary TCP port 1069Anyone who can see the traffic can read the login. A firmware upgrade is a risky moment on a shared network
Hard-coded and reusable secretsA hard-coded password in public software that can decrypt traffic; one encryption key reused across sessions, so a captured encrypted password can be replayedThe protection exists but can be defeated by anyone with the software or a capture
Client-side enforcementSecurity checks for management operations on TCP port 1069 enforced only on the clientA modified client can skip the check
Privilege flawsA protected-privilege user can call system configuration and serial port settings over telnetA limited account is not limited
AvailabilityFailed logins on telnet port 23 can cause denial of serviceA camera can be knocked offline by repeated login failures
File permissionsWeak default permissions on a Windows data folder allow files to be modifiedA local user on the Explorer PC can change what the software reads

CISA’s CVSS v4 vectors show five adjacent-network, two local and two network-based entries (the v3.1 vectors show three network-based). That pattern matters: most of these need to be on the same network segment as the camera, or on the Explorer PC. A flat plant network gives an attacker exactly that.

Blurred lines of programming code on a dark screen
Most of these flaws are design choices from an earlier era: credentials, keys and checks that assumed a trusted network.

Why there is no patch

CISA’s advisory does not mention a firmware fix or a fixed version. It quotes Cognex stating that In-Sight Explorer-based systems are “legacy products not intended for new applications”, and it advises moving to In-Sight Vision Suite systems, such as the In-Sight 2800, 3800 and 8900 embedded cameras. SecurityWeek reported on 26 September 2025 that Cognex will not release patches, and the Nozomi Networks researchers’ write-up of 24 September 2025 says no security patches are planned.

In our view, the sensible reading is that Cognex has chosen replacement over remediation for this generation. We cannot see Cognex’s internal reasoning, and we did not find a Cognex end-of-life notice, so we do not describe the cameras as discontinued. For how Cognex signals status, see the lifecycle page.

What CISA recommends

CISA’s mitigations are general ICS practice, repeated on most advisories:

  • Minimise network exposure for control system devices, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
  • Place control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
  • Use a VPN when remote access is required, recognising that a VPN is only as secure as the devices connected to it, and keep the VPN updated.
  • Assess the impact and risk before deploying defensive measures.

At publication CISA reported no known public exploitation of these vulnerabilities.

What to do on a plant network

Where the advisory's flaws are reachable Two exposure points. On the left, the Explorer workstation, where the Windows data folder permission flaw lives. On the right, the older In-Sight camera, which exposes telnet on TCP port 23 and a proprietary service on TCP port 1069. A line between them shows firmware upgrades and management traffic on port 1069. A firewall boundary around both limits who can reach either point, shown as the control that matters most because no patch exists. Cell zone behind a firewall: the control that matters when there is no patch Explorer workstation Windows data folder permissions weak limit who can log in Older In-Sight camera telnet on TCP 23 service on TCP 1069 no patch offered management and firmware traffic sent over TCP 1069
The flaws sit at two points, the Explorer workstation and the camera's own ports, and the traffic between them carries the credentials, so the firewall boundary around both is the control.
  1. Find every affected camera and Explorer install. Use your PLC and switch records as well as a walk of the lines. Record model and firmware.
  2. Remove any route from the business network or internet to those cameras and workstations.
  3. Zone the cell. Allow the PLC, one engineering workstation and the image server to reach the cameras, and nothing else. Block TCP 23 from anywhere that does not need it, if your use allows.
  4. Do firmware upgrades and job transfers only inside the zone, from a known workstation, never over a shared or routed network. The advisory says credentials are exposed during an upgrade.
  5. Control the Explorer PC. Named accounts, operating-system patching, no general use.
  6. Rotate and limit passwords on cameras, and do not reuse them across lines.
  7. Log and alert on new connections to the camera ports.
  8. Schedule replacement. See replacing older In-Sight cameras.

An OT network assessment is how we would do steps 1 to 3 and 7 for a plant, and the ISA/IEC 62443 pillar explains the zone and conduit thinking behind them. Check Cognex’s current documentation before blocking any port, since a camera’s PLC connection uses its own protocol ports.

What the advisory does not say

It does not say the cameras are unsafe to run. It describes flaws that mostly need access to the camera’s ports or the Explorer PC, and it reports no known exploitation at publication. It does not give a date after which Cognex stops supporting the cameras, and it does not list any DataMan reader. It also does not say which firmware inside the 5.x to 6.5.1 range is better; CISA treats the whole range as affected, so we do not recommend a firmware revision as a fix.

It does not replace your own risk judgment. A camera on an isolated cell network with one engineering workstation carries a different risk from one on a flat plant network. Score each by exposure and by what its failure would stop, then sequence replacement accordingly.

Where it gets hard

  • Blocking telnet can break a workflow. Some plants use it for maintenance. Find out first.
  • Cameras you cannot find. A camera installed by an OEM inside a machine may not be on any inventory.
  • A shared network with the machine builder. The cell zone may be owned by the OEM, not by you.
  • Replacement is not instant. Moving to Vision Suite systems means rebuilding jobs and revisiting PLC handshakes, as the replacement page explains. Until then the controls above are the defence.
  • Rest of the Cognex line. An older advisory covered the 3D-A1000 and another the In-Sight OPC Server; both are in the table on the parent page, which is also where to read about the Cognex lifecycle model.

Related reading: Vision Suite vs In-Sight Explorer for the software split.

Frequently asked questions

Which Cognex products does ICSA-25-261-06 affect?

CISA lists the In-Sight 2000, 7000, 8000 and 9000 series cameras and the In-Sight Explorer software, all versions 5.x through 6.5.1. The advisory was released on 18 September 2025 with an overall CVSS v4 score of 8.6. The 2800, 3800 and 8900 systems are not in the advisory.

Is there a patch for the In-Sight Explorer vulnerabilities?

The advisory names no fixed version. It quotes Cognex describing In-Sight Explorer-based systems as legacy products not intended for new applications and advises moving to In-Sight Vision Suite systems such as the 2800, 3800 and 8900. For installed cameras the practical defence is network containment.

Can an attacker use these flaws from the internet?

CISA's CVSS v4 vectors show five adjacent-network, two local and two network-based entries. In practice an attacker needs a path to the camera's ports or the Explorer workstation, which is why CISA tells operators to keep control systems off the internet and behind firewalls.

Were these vulnerabilities being exploited?

At publication CISA reported that no known public exploitation of these vulnerabilities had been reported to it. That statement is dated September 2025, so check the current advisory page. The flaws were reported by Diego Giubertoni of Nozomi Networks.

What should we do if we cannot replace the cameras yet?

Inventory every affected camera and Explorer installation, remove any internet path, place the cameras in a firewalled cell zone that allows only the PLC, one engineering workstation and the image server, restrict who can log into the workstation, and plan replacement. Test any change before applying it to a running line.

References and further reading

  1. Cognex In-Sight Explorer and In-Sight Camera Firmware (ICSA-25-261-06) · CISAThe primary source for everything on this page.
  2. No Patches for Vulnerabilities Allowing Cognex Industrial Camera Hacking · SecurityWeekTrade-press coverage of the no-patch position, 26 September 2025.
  3. Nozomi Networks Labs: Cognex In-Sight IS2000M-120 smart camera vulnerabilities · Nozomi NetworksThe researchers' own write-up.
  4. Cognex 3D-A1000 Dimensioning System (ICSA-22-249-03) · CISA

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