octoplant OT Security Integration: Configuration Data Alongside Claroty, Nozomi, Dragos and Armis

An octoplant OT security integration is a question about two views of the same plant. Network platforms such as Claroty, Nozomi, Dragos, Armis, TXOne and Tenable see devices and the traffic between them. octoplant sees what is inside each device: the program, the configuration, the firmware, and whether it still matches the approved version. As of October 2026 we found no public, productised integration between AMDT and any of those vendors. What exists is a CSV import into octovision and AMDT’s export paths to a SIEM. This page explains how the two views complement each other and the three workflows where joining them pays off.

It sits under OTSSM and Integrations. For the head-to-head view of what each tool category does and does not replace, see octoplant vs network OT security.

Two views of the same asset

AMDT draws the distinction itself. Its enterprise OT visibility page describes octovision as built from “project and configuration data already collected through Octoplant,” with no additional interrogation of live devices, and network-centric discovery as relying on “active queries or passive observation of network traffic.” AMDT’s octovision page goes further and says it “complements your current stack” without replacing tools (octoplant.com).

The vendor-neutral version of this argument, covering network-based and configuration-based inventory across all tools, is on our OT asset inventory page.

The state of octoplant OT security integration

Gartner’s 2026 Magic Quadrant for CPS Protection Platforms evaluated 13 vendors and named four Leaders. Claroty and Nozomi Networks have each announced their Leader placement (Claroty, Nozomi Networks); the placement of the other vendors below is in Gartner’s report. The table summarises each platform’s relationship to device-content data, as of October 2026.

Platform	What it adds	Recent context	Public AMDT integration
Claroty	Network-based inventory, exposure management, secure access	Already enriches Rockwell FactoryTalk AssetCentre with vulnerability and threat data (Claroty partners)	None found
Nozomi Networks	Passive and active inventory, threat detection	Acquired by Mitsubishi Electric, closed 28 January 2026 (SecurityBrief)	None found
Dragos	Threat detection, intelligence, incident response	Accenture majority stake with runZero and NetRise, adding firmware and software supply-chain content (Pulse2)	None found
Armis	Asset intelligence across IT, OT and IoT	Now part of ServiceNow, closed 20 April 2026 (ServiceNow)	None found; see octoplant and ServiceNow
TXOne Networks	Endpoint and network protection for OT	Endpoint lockdown complements logic integrity	None found
Tenable OT Security	Network visibility, with active querying of controllers on some deployments	Check how deep its configuration snapshot goes for your devices	None found

The pattern is notable. Claroty already enriches a single-vendor change management tool. Dragos, through NetRise, is moving toward firmware content. Each security platform is reaching for the device-content layer that octoplant occupies, which is why a buyer should ask both vendors about their roadmap before assuming the gap stays open.

What does exist: the octovision CSV import

The octovision Summer Release 2026 lets a site “import asset lists from any source using a structured CSV file,” including discovery tools, maintenance systems and spreadsheets (octoplant.com). Three things follow:

1. Coverage becomes measurable. A coverage view splits octoplant-managed from unmanaged assets, grouped by type, so the devices the network platform sees but octoplant does not back up show up as a gap.
2. Imported assets get context. CVE and lifecycle enrichment is applied “where they can be matched.”
3. It is a file, not a feed. The import is a scheduled or manual exchange. Somebody owns the export from the security platform and the import into octovision.

Three workflows where an octoplant OT security integration pays off

1. Incident forensics. A network platform alerts on a program download to a packaging line controller from an engineering workstation at 02:40 (illustrative). The SOC asks what changed. The octoplant version history and a Smart Compare of the running program against the last approved version answer it in minutes: a timer preset and two rungs. The alert becomes either a closed maintenance event or a confirmed incident, with a known-good version ready to restore.

2. Unauthorized logic change. octoplant’s change detection flags a running program that no longer matches the approved one. On its own, that tells you something changed. Correlated with the network platform’s record of which host connected and when, it tells you how. A change with no matching network session points to a local laptop on the device, which is a different conversation from a remote write.

3. Vulnerability prioritisation. octovision matches CVEs against firmware read from project data (see octovision vulnerability management). The network platform knows which of those devices are reachable from where. Combined with process criticality, a backlog of hundreds of CVEs collapses to the few devices that are vulnerable, reachable and critical, which is the list maintenance can act on in the next shutdown.

How to join the two views today

Without a vendor connector, a site can still get most of the value with a modest, well-owned process:

1. Export the discovery inventory from the security platform on a fixed schedule, monthly at first, and import it into octovision by CSV.
2. Work the unmanaged list. Every controller, HMI, robot or drive the network platform sees but octoplant does not back up is a recovery gap. Assign each one to a backup job or record why it is excluded.
3. Send octoplant and octovision events to the SIEM through the Export API or file exports: detected changes, failed jobs and new CVE matches.
4. Write correlation rules that pair a network write or download alert with a detected program change on the same asset within a time window.
5. Agree a joint runbook between the SOC and the controls team: who confirms a change was planned, who restores, who closes the ticket.

A plant scenario (illustrative). A water utility imports its network platform’s asset list into octovision and finds that 30 of its 140 outstation controllers have never had a backup taken. None of them would have shown up as a risk in the security console, because they are behaving normally on the network. The first month of the integration produces no alerts, and still closes the largest recovery gap the utility has.

Where it gets hard

• No shared identifier. Network platforms key on IP and MAC addresses; octoplant keys on the component tree engineers built. Matching them is manual until a vendor ships a connector.
• Two inventories, two truths. Decide which tool is authoritative for each attribute, or the SOC and controls will argue over every discrepancy.
• Correlation needs a home. The SIEM is the natural place, but OT events need parsing rules the SOC rarely has. Budget for that work.
• Ownership splits. Security owns the platform, controls owns octoplant. Joint workflows need a joint runbook.

If you are deciding how these layers fit your network, an OT network assessment maps what each tool would see before you buy. Related: the octoplant Export API and the AMDT hub.